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Abstract
Background: In order to facilitate public health response and to achieve early control of infectious disease epidemics, an
adjustable epidemiologic information system (AEIS) was established in the Taiwan public health network in February 2006.
Methodology/Principal Findings: The performance of AEIS for the period 2006 through 2008 was evaluated based on a
number of response times (RT) and the public health impact. After implementation of the system, the apparent overall
shortened RT was mainly due to the shortening of personnel response time (PRT) and the time needed to draft a new
questionnaire that incurred as personnel-system interface (PSI); PRT dropped from a fluctuating range of 9.8 ,28.8 days in
the first four months to ,10 days in the following months and remained low till 2008 (0.8861.52 days). The PSIs for newly
emerged infectious diseases were 2.6 and 3.4 person-hours for H5N1 in 2007 and chikungunya in 2008, respectively, a much
improvement from 1142.5 person-hours for SARS in 2003. The duration of each rubella epidemic cluster was evaluated as
public health impact and showed a shortening trend (p=0.019) that concurred with the shortening of PRT from 64.8647.3
to 25.2638.2 hours per cluster (p,0.0001).
Conclusions/Significance: The first evaluation of the novel instrument AEIS that had been used to assist Taiwan’s multi-
level government for infectious diseases control demonstrated that it was well integrated into the existing public health
infrastructure. It provided flexible tools and computer algorithms with friendly interface for timely data collection,
integration, and analysis; as a result, it shortened RTs, filled in gaps of personnel lacking sufficient experiences, created a
more efficient flow of response, and identified asymptomatic/mild cases early to minimize further spreading. With further
development, AEIS is anticipated to be useful in the application of other acute public health events needing immediate
orchestrated data collection and public health actions.
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Introduction
Effective control of infectious disease (ID) outbreaks requires a
prompt public health response which depends on the ability of
public health institutions to detect the initial episodes of the
outbreak and the availability of tools that facilitate epidemiologic
investigation and disease control. During the multi-country
outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in
2003, public health officers experienced difficulties in prompt
data collection and analysis, due primarily to the lack of an
efficient information system to integrate the epidemiologic,
clinical and laboratory information collected during the rapidly
evolving epidemic phases in different epidemic settings [1].
Anticipating that similar difficulties would continue to hamper
responses to future emerging infe c t i o u sd i s e a s e s( E I D s ) ,T a i w a n
Centers for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC) undertook a
comprehensive systemic review to identify public health defi-
ciencies [1,2] and subsequently underwent restructuring in the
post-SARS era.
Description of the AEIS
A comprehensive web-based information system for nation-
wide use in all infectious disease surveillance and outbreak
management, termed ‘‘adjustable epidemiologic information
system’’ (AEIS), was established on February 13
th, 2006. AEIS
not only incorporated the existing information systems used in
the national surveillance of ID (Figure 1A and 1B), i.e., the
Taiwan National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System
(NDSS), central microbiological laboratory diagnostic system,
and National Immunization Information System (NIIS), but it
also provided tools to synchronize and integrate epidemiological,
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14596laboratory and clinical information to robustly manage cases and
their contacts, and to conduct data analysis under time
constraints.
As shown in Figure 1A and 1B, much of the repetitive tasks
executed by public health personnel in response to the occurrence
of ID cases or outbreaks (Figure 1A in designing questionnaire) is
replaced by computerized algorithms of the AEIS (Figure 1B steps
A2 to C) as stored institutional knowledge for easy access by public
health personnel. To this end, a template questionnaire for each of
the 56 IDs was first installed in AEIS (Table S1). A bank of
template questions (Figure 1B step A1) was compiled, and each
digitalized question was conformed to standardized elements and
pre-set fields which were suitable for integration and analysis by
the built-in algorithms; questions related to common epidemic
scenarios could be grouped into modules for easy access to be
assembled into new template questionnaire for future use in EIDs.
The system flow starts with case reporting to NDSS which sends
a signal for AEIS to output a template questionnaire (Figure 1B
Steps A2 to C) corresponding to one of the 56 the ID to be
investigated. For EIDs and specific epidemiological scenarios, a
new template questionnaire (Figure 1B Step A2) could be
generated by the TW-CDC investigation system working group
(ISWG) by drawing from the bank of relevant questions and
modules (Figure 1B Step A1). The questionnaire design would
then undergo build-in algorithms to filter and consolidate
redundant questions (when multiple diseases were suspected in
the case) (Figure 1B Steps B1 and B2); the questions were then re-
ordered into the final format of the questionnaire (Figure 1B Step
C). The time interval needed for this process is termed ‘‘Response
time (RT) for generating the template questionnaire’’ (QRT) and
is made up of a personnel-system interface (PSI) and a system
response time (SRT=
X 5
i~1
Si) (Figure 1B Steps A1 and A2 to C),
i.e., QRT=PSI+SRT. For the 56 notifiable IDs, QRT was nearly
negligible as template questionnaires were built in. It is worth
noting that a large portion of the personnel time that made up
QRT prior to AEIS has been transformed into PSI, i.e., computer-
assisted personnel time.
Figure 1. The system architecture and data flow of infectious disease case reporting in Taiwan before (Panel A) and after (Panel B)
the implementation of AEIS. National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System
a(NDSS) receives infectious disease (ID) cases reporting from
btwo
sources: passive case finding by physicians or active case identification by public health officers. (A) Prior to AEIS: Taiwan CDC managed ID-related
health information by using three information systems: NDSS, central microbiological laboratory diagnostic system, and National Immunization
Information System
c(NIIS); for epidemic investigation,
dpre-designed digital questionnaires were available for 18 notifiable diseases, and paper-based
questionnaires had to be generated as needed each time for all other notifiable diseases. (B) After the application of AEIS: Template
questionnaires (A2) for use in investigating all 56 notifiable diseases are available in digital format. For EIDs and specific epidemiological scenarios,
eTW-CDC ISWG (Taiwan CDC investigation system working group) adopts the available template questions in the ‘‘question bank’’ (A1) to generate
the template questionnaire (A2), herein, the time interval needed for this process is termed response time for generating template questionnaire
(QRT), [
fPSI (personnel-system interface)+SRT]. AEIS contains three system-operated
galgorithms to filter and consolidate redundant questions (B1),
generate a preliminary questionnaire (B2) and re-order questions into the final version of the questionnaire (C), and integrate data management (B3)
and analysis; the time period is termed system response time (SRT),
X 5
i~2
Si. The centralized database (E) which integrated clinical, epidemiological,
and laboratory data from NDSS, NIIS, and AEIS, can perform real-time analysis upon request (F). Direction of information flow is indicated with arrows
in solid lines; blue indicates system-operated automatic information flow, and black indicates information flow between personnel activity (reporting
and data entry) and the system. The personnel response time,
hPRT, is from having the final version of the questionnaire to the completion of the
epidemic investigation and data entry (D), PRT. Results of the first-tier analysis will be fed back to three stake-holders (shown by dotted blue lines): (1)
to Taiwan CDC ISWG for policy decision making, (2) to public health officers for fine-tuning on-site control measures, and (3) for border quarantine
through the Autonomous Health Management System
i(AHMS).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.g001
Taiwan Epi. Information System
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14596The questionnaire was easily accessed from the Taiwan CDC
website by the field investigation team using an authorized code;
the time required for the personnel activity-related interval from
having the questionnaire (case report/confirmation) to the
completion of epidemic investigation and data entry is designated
as ‘‘Personnel RT’’ (PRT) (PRT in Figure 1B Steps C and D).
Thus, the overall ‘‘Epidemiologic Investigation RT’’ (EIRT) would
be PSI+
X 5
i~1
Si+PRT (Figure 1B: PSI, S1 to S5 and PRT), or
QRT+PRT. Since this was the first evaluation of AEIS, only the
overall EIRT, along with its elements, was the focus of this report.
The centralized database in AEIS (Figure 1B Step E), contains
epidemiological information with integrated clinical and labora-
tory data from NDSS and NIIS, and has a built-in first tier data
analysis algorithm to provide a real-time epidemiological report
upon request (Figure 1B Step F). Results of the first-tier analysis
and report can be fed back to the three stake-holders: (1) for a re-
evaluation process by the Taiwan CDC ISWG advisory board for
policy decisions, (2) for fine-tuning on-site control measures by
public health officers, and (3) for border quarantine through the
Autonomous Health Management System (AHMS). In this first
evaluation of AEIS, RT of data analysis was not our focus.
Aims of the evaluation study
AEIS is a novel information system conceptually designed to
empower the public health system for a more rapid response to
implement infectious disease control. The evaluation study is
meant to empirically estimate the RTs of AEIS, and query
specifically whether the AEIS fitted into the public health network
well enough so as to shorten the PSI operating time, then we
evaluated whether the shortened RTs, mostly owing to the
shortened PSI, in responding to infectious disease outbreak might
have a positive impact on public health (Figure S1), similar to that
of a previous study in evaluating whether shortened RTs might
improve the survival of patients in the settings of emergency
medicine [3].
Methods
General design
The AEIS was evaluated for its performance based on the
database compiled for the 51 acute IDs (excluding 5 chronic IDs
from the 56 total notifiable IDs) during the initial period beginning
on February 13
th, 2006 through the end of 2008. In AEIS
database, parameters pertaining to each individual confirmed
cases included gender, birthday, nationality, county of residence,
diagnosis, immunization history, occupation, travel history,
medical history, history of contacts’ and their immunization
records, source of report, and symptoms, as well as dates of onset,
reporting, case confirmation, final format questionnaire generated,
first time epidemiologic investigation and data entry. Dates and
methods of control measures, e.g., immunization, environmental
disinfection or quarantine, were implemented also available in the
database. By analyzing these parameters, all elements of RTs
incurred during the flow for each outbreak response could be
estimated, which was the primary goal of this study. Temporal
trends of EIRTs were also studied by stratified analysis according
to routes of transmission and population densities; finally the
correlation between RTs and public health outcome were also
studied.
In addition to instrumentation (such as AEIS), the availability of
trained professionals of all levels and a harmonized vertical
(central to local government) and horizontal interagency coordi-
nation are other elements in the public health infrastructure that
could affect the efficiency in public health response measures
(including RTs). However, these factors were not within the scope
of our study as we evaluated AEIS performance focusing on how
well it performed as a part of the network of the evolving public
health infrastructure during the study period, rather than
attempting to tease out the proportional changes of RT that was
solely attributable to AEIS. Furthermore, historical EIRTs prior to
the implementation of AEIS were extracted from the Taiwan
CDC archived records to serve as reference measures.
Definition of various response times
(1) QRT, that is the most pertinent indicator for AEIS, is the time
interval from beginning to design the questionnaire, i.e., the
first EID case report triggering AEIS, to the time the template
in final format is available for epidemiological investigation.
QRT was the sum of two components, the personnel-system
interface (PSI) and SRT (defined below).
(2) SRT is included as part of QRT as the time required for the
system to consolidate questions, regroup and reorganize the
questions according to the logistics of obtaining information
and following the algorithms for future analysis, to the final
format; the precise time of execution is automatically logged
by AEIS (Figure 1B: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5).
(3) PRT is the time from having the final format of the
questionnaire to the time of completion of the epidemic
investigation and data entry; all are contributed by personnel
activities and PSI during data entry (Figures 1A and 1B:
PRT).
(4) The ‘‘Epidemiologic Investigation RT’’ (EIRT), the sum of
QRT (including SRT) and PRT (Figure 1B: S1 to S5 and
PRT), is the interval from case reporting/confirmation to the
completion of epidemic investigation and data entry.
(5) ‘‘RT for case confirmation’’ (CRT) is the time elapsed from
the date of onset to the time of case confirmation/exclusion of
each EID case by laboratory diagnosis. This is largely
dependent on the time required for a diagnostic test and is
most pertinent for EIDs with high morbidity and mortality, as
control measures include quarantine of contacts.
Acute notifiable IDs
For the 51 acute notifiable IDs, template questionnaires were
readily available via AEIS and required no modification, thus the
QRT were negligible, and only the PRT was included in
measuring EIRT for these diseases. We hypothesized that the
implementation of AEIS might shorten the overall EIRT if the
proportion of the PRT prior to AEIS which was replaced by PSI
and SRT would be sufficiently shortened. Based on this premise,
EIRTs were compared for time consumption prior to and after the
application of AEIS (Figure 1A and 1B). Detailed information
about the corresponding time frame for EIRT prior to AEIS was
scattered in offices of different administrative jurisdictions;
therefore, we selected shigellosis for which we could extract EIRT
information from the 14 reported clusters of shigellosis outbreaks
published in Taiwan Epidemiology Bulletin from 1987 to 2005
[4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. The reference period prior
to AEIS was divided into two parts: 1987–2003 and the post-
SARS era of 2004–2005 when mass infusion of public health
resources occurred; this allowed evaluation of the possible effects
of other preparedness activities and resource infusion. The AEIS
evaluation period was divided into 2006–2007 as the learning
period and 2008 as the study end point.
Taiwan Epi. Information System
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modes of transmission [6] and by levels of population density. For the
control of each ID, Taiwan CDC has proposed a guideline of time
frames within which an epidemic investigation must be initiated.
These were based on the routes of transmission, among other
epidemic features, and different levels of urgency in responding to a
specific ID (Table S1). By nature, PRT could vary according to the
route of transmission. Thus, we queried whether algorithms in AEIS
fitted the need of different categories of IDs. The population density
was used as a surrogate for the level of urbanization and
development; such a stratified analysis was based on the hypothesis
that public health personnel in the remote areas, which were usually
with low population density, may be less well trained and have
difficulties in receiving continuing professional training and thus
might have more difficulties to adapt to a new instrument (increased
PSI). The population density of each administrative region (at the
level of counties and cities) was grouped into high (3,000 or more
people/km
2), medium (637 to 2,999 people/km
2), and low (636 or
less people/km
2) for analysis of their PRT.
Application to EIDs
Based on previous experience in EIDs, QRT was mostly
responsible for a lengthy EIRT. During the study period, two
EIDs were added to the list of notifiable IDs, i.e. avian influenza
H5N1 and chikungunya. Template questionnaires for these two
EIDs were designed from scratch by reassembling questions from
the bank, and this PSI interval could be calculated from the
computer log. The QRT for SARS in 2003 was included for
comparison (Figure 1B: PSI+PRT). For EIDs, the case definition
for reporting included a category of ‘‘presumptive’’ case, i.e., cases
fitting the clinical and/or epidemiological definition without a
laboratory diagnosis, thus, CRT is an important indicator for
allocation of public health resources such as implementing
isolation or quarantine in the case of EIDs.
Evaluating Asymptomatic Case Identification
All reported ID cases in the NDSS were from one of two sources:
passive reporting by physicians or active case identification by
epidemiologic investigation or mass screening. We hypothesized
that an efficient public response would result in a reduction of case
occurrence, and thus a reductionin passively reported case number,
whereas the proportion of cases identified by active case finding via
epidemiologic investigation, mostly likely to be asymptomatic or
mild cases, might increase in proportion. We focused on diseases
with higher transmissibility and different transmission routes, using
shigellosis (fecal-oral transmission) and rubella (respiratory-trans-
mission with vaccine available) diseases, to study the influence of
these factors on the proportion of asymptomatic cases identified.
Evaluating Public Health Impact
We hypothesized that a shortened RT would reduce the size
and duration of each outbreak cluster so the correlations between
PRT and cluster size were analyzed quantitatively. The duration
of the cluster was defined as the time between the dates of onset of
the index case and of the last case in the cluster. The weekly
epicurve for each rubella cluster was plotted according to the week
of onset of each case in each cluster in relation to the index case.
The total of 83 laboratory-confirmed rubella cases from 2007
through 2008 was analyzed using the linkage analysis algorithm of
AEIS to query the spatial-temporal clustering relationship (see
Text S1 in supporting information for cluster definition). The
correlations among percentage of cases identified by epidemiologic
investigation, PRT, and the duration of each cluster were
calculated. The clusters were analyzed in chronological order
based on the date of onset of the index case.
Data analysis
The data were extracted from AEIS database and downloaded
in Microsoft Excel and Access format. The statistical analyses were
performed in SAS 9.1 and SPSS 14. The geographical distribution
analysis was performed in Arc GIS 9.2.
The Kruskall-Wallis test was employed to test whether the
median trends of PRT would be associated with different modes of
transmission and areas with different levels of population density.
The 95% confidence intervals for proportion of asymptomatic and
mild cases identified were calculated using the Wilson score
method [18] and the trends across the four stages were evaluated
using the Cochran-Armitage trend test. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA), t tests and Mann-Whitney Test were employed to test
EIRT, SRT and PRT, before and after the implementation of
AEIS. Associations between PRT and cluster duration were
analyzed using Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient (SRCC). A
p-value of 0.05 was considered to be statistically significant.
Results
Response time
For the 51 notifiable acute IDs, we first analyzed PRT based on the
total 10037 ID cases registered in the AEIS database for the years
2006 (2498 cases), 2007 (4220 cases) and 2008 (3319 cases). PRT
included the time needed to conduct field investigation (pure
personnel time) and to enter the data (PSI). After the implementation
of the AEIS on February 13
th 2006, the weekly mean PRT dropped
precipitously from a fluctuating range between 9.8 and 28.8 days in
the first four months to a range of less than 10 days in the following
months (Figure 2). The decreasing trend continued with a yearly
mean PRT of 6.92622.11 days in 2006, 2.1365.77 days in 2007,
and 0.8861.52 days in 2008. During 2006, there was no change of
AEIS either the programming or computer capacity, and there was
no major changes in the human resources among the local public
healthofficials,thusthedecreasingtrendofPRTmightbereasonably
attributed to an improved PSI owing to the public health personnel
having surpassed the learning period of a new instrument.
We then analyzed PRT by transmission route (Figure 3A),
PRTs of all five groups of IDs decreased significantly over the
study period without any exception, i.e., PRT reduction occurred
mostly in the first two years of 2006 and 2007, and by 2008, the
mean PRTs were ,1 day for all but blood-borne diseases. The
PRT was further evaluated for regions stratified by population
density as a proxy for levels of urbanization and socioeconomic
development (Figure 3B). Regardless of population density, a
significant shortening of the PRT was observed over the three
years following the implementation of AEIS; the overall mean
PRT reduction from 2006 to 2008 was 89.4%, 90.0% and 82.8%
for areas of high, medium, and low population densities,
respectively (p,0.0001, Kruskall-Wallis test) (Figure 3B). The
initial mean PRT of the low population density districts were
similar to the high population density districts; but it is worth
noting that finally it reached the comparable PRT as that of the
medium level districts in 2008 (p=0.097, Mann-Whitney Test).
Since there was no equivalent information on PRT prior to AEIS
for comparison, we identified shigellosis, for which EIRT could be
extracted, as a suitable disease for conducting case study to compare
the overall EIRT before (reference era) and after AEIS (study era)
(Table 1). The overall trend of reduction in mean EIRT was highly
significant throughout the reference and study periods (p,0.001,
ANOVA)(Table1);however,thereductionofmeanEIRTsbetween
Taiwan Epi. Information System
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0.6 incurred between the intra-era periods before and after AEIS.
The mean SRT for shigellosis cases, as for all other notifiable
IDs (data not shown), remained nearly unchanged during the
study period, 0.5660.04 days in 2006,2007 and 0.5460.01 days
in 2008 (p=0.719, ANOVA) (Table 1). In contrast, the PRT
(Figure 1B, steps C to D) was greatly reduced from a mean of
1.1860.09 days in 2006,2007 to 0.6660.07 days in 2008
(p,0.001, ANOVA) (Table 1). Thus, the improvement in EIRT
during the first three years of AEIS was attributed primarily to the
improved PRT (especially PSI).
QRT and CRT: Application of AEIS to EIDs
A new template questionnaire would be designed as needed for
each EID as it occurred. During the study period, chikungunya
and H5N1 were two EIDs added to the list of notifiable diseases.
The public health personnel, assisted with AEIS algorithms,
selected questions from the bank of questions in modules to
Figure 2. Epicurve of the 51 acute notifiable infectious diseases and its mean personnel response time by week, 2006,2008. Left
axis is the total weekly case number of the 51 notifiable acute IDs in Taiwan indicated in blue bars, January 1
st 2006 through December 31
st 2008; the
right axis is the AEIS-related weekly mean personnel response times (PRT) shown in red line, February 13
th 2006 through December 31
st 2008; orange
dotted line indicates the beginning of AEIS implementation. Several seemingly high mean PRT for the period coincided with the ongoing large
Dengue outbreaks (marked with black arrows) occurring in 2006 through 2007; two more peaks of mean PRT (marked with grey arrows) were due to
newly added one case each of HBV and HCV which were newly added to the list of IDs requiring epidemiological investigation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.g002
Figure 3. Personnel Response Time of (A) diseases category by transmission routes, and (B) areas by various population densities,
February 13
th, 2006 to December 31
st, 2008. The personnel response time (PRT) (line) was defined as the response time from case report/
confirmation to epidemiologic investigation and data entry. The horizontal bar indicates 6 two standard errors (SE). An asterisk demonstrates a p-
value of ,0.0001. (A) PRT by routes of transmission including respiratory, fecal-oral, vector-borne, blood-borne and contact transmission. (B) PRT by
areas of various population densities. The population density was classified as high (3,000 or more people/km
2), medium (637 to 2,999 people/km
2)
and low (636 or less people/km
2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.g003
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PSI which was 2.6 person-hours for H5N1 and 3.4 person-hours
for chikungunya. The mean QRTs were 0.6860.01 days (range
0.67 to 0.70 days) for chikungunya and 0.10760.416 days (range 0
to2 days) for H5N1. Both were drastically reduced from the
1142.5 person-hours required during the SARS epidemic.
The five presumptive chikungunya cases were reported between
November 1 and December 31, 2008, with maximal mean PRT of
0.2660.34 days (range 0.03 to 0.75 days). The CRT for
chikungunya was .14 days, as reflected by the time required to
conduct laboratory tests for specimens of convalescence period to
definitively confirm or exclude chikungunya. For these reported
chikungunya cases, subsequently confirmed in four (Table S3), the
mean CRT of chikungunya was 11.9610.7 days (range 2.67 to
27.74 days).
For reporting a suspected human H5N1 case, the Taiwan CDC
has suggested cap of a 24-hour from reporting to the initiation of
investigation using a questionnaire form modified from the WHO
version [19], i.e., the QRT+SRT+PRT being one day and a 3-day
cap to complete the investigation (EIRT) and the first stage control
measures once the case were confirmed. While there have been no
confirmed H5N1 human cases, 29 suspected H5N1 cases had
been reported based on the travel history and compatible clinical
syndrome (Table S4). The EIRTs of the 29 suspected H5N1 cases
were all within the suggested 3 day cap. The average CRT for
these 29 cases was 5.060.6 days with a range of 1 to 28 days as
compared with a mean of 32.2648.5 days for SARS (p,0.0001,
t test).
Asymptomatic and mild cases identified by epidemic
investigation
We queried whether the asymptomatic and mild cases identified
by epidemiologic investigation, as opposed to the passive reporting
of symptomatic cases might change over time. For this analysis, we
selected shigellosis and rubella as case studies, and extracted
information from the reference period of January 1
st, 2000
through February 12
th, 2006 for comparison with the data
collected from our study period.
For shigellosis cases, the average proportion of cases identified
by epidemiologic investigation showed an overall decreasing trend
(p=0.0075, Cochran-Armitage test for trend) (Table 2). Of note,
the total shigellosis cases also decreased from more than 200/year
to 25/year in 2008. The asymptomatic fraction among these
actively identified shigellosis cases was 87.5% (85.1%, 89.6%) in
2000–2003 that decreased to 20.8% (14.7%, 28.5%) in 2004–
2005, and then increased to 60% (40.7%, 76.6%) in 2008
(p,0.0001) (Table 2).
The rubella cases number increased since 2007, and was found
to be related to institutes with high proportion of unimmunized
foreign students or workers. The proportion of rubella cases
identified by epidemiologic investigation showed an increasing
trend from 5.8% (2.0%, 15.6%) in the reference period to 51.5%
(32.5%, 64.8%) in 2008 (p,0.0001) (Table 2). All the three rubella
cases actively identified were all asymptomatic in 2000–2003, and
the asymptomatic fraction increased from 4.1% (1.1%, 13.7%)
in 2006–2007 to 17.6% (6.2%, 41.0%) in 2008 (p=0.1105)
(Table 2).
Evaluating Impact of Public Health Responses
During the study period, NDSS recorded 5 epidemiologically-
linked rubella clusters. This presented a good opportunity for case
study to examine whether shortened PRT had any impact on
public health outcomes such as the size and the duration of each
cluster (Figure 4A-4C). This study extracted 83 confirmed cases
reported during the study period, and an additional cluster (#6)
was identified via spatial-temporal and epidemiological linkage
analysis (definition of cluster refer to supporting information, Text
S1). The 69 clustered cases, 83.1% of the total of 83 confirmed
rubella cases, occurred in 2007 (2 clusters) and in 2008 (4 clusters)
(Figure 4A). Each cluster, which was numbered according to the
temporal sequence of the date of onset of the index case, consisted
of 23, 23, 7, 10, 3 and 3 cases in size; the cluster size showed a
decreasing trend (SRCC =20.912, p=0.006). The mean PRT
shortened over time with the first cluster requiring an average of
64.8647.3 hours to the last cluster’s 25.2638.2 hours (SRCC =
20.547, p,0.0001) (Figure 4C). Correspondingly, the general
trend of the mean duration of cluster also shortened over time with
the first cluster requiring 32.765.4 days to 4.862.5 days for the
fourth cluster, and then 4064.2 days for the last cluster (SRCC =
20.086, p=0.436). This trend of PRT shortening was concurrent
with the shortened duration of the cluster (SRCC =0.283,
p=0.019) (Figure 4B-4C) but was not correlated with the cluster
size (SRCC =0.647, p=0.165).
The six rubella clusters occurred in counties with higher
population densities of foreign residents [20]; the ratios of
foreigners to the total number of registered residents were 0.040
in Taoyuan, 0.019 in Changhua, 0.021 in Miaoli, and 0.016 in
Taipei Counties as compared to that of all other counties in
Taiwan [0.016, 95% confidence interval (0.014, 0.019)]
(p=0.0125, Mann-Whitney Test). Linkage to NIIS through AEIS
disclosed that all but one were expatriates who had not been
immunized. The only Taiwanese case, a 21 year-old female
student, was reported as having been immunized but the
immunization record was untraceable.
Table 1. Mean Response Times (days) during the epidemiologic investigation of shigellosis cases, before and after AEIS
application.
Before AEIS Era AEIS Era p-value
1987,2003 2004,05 2006,07 2008 (ANOVA)
EIRT 5.161.4 4.560.5 1.860.1 1.260.1 ,0.001
Reduction of EIRT*
¨
D=0.6
¨
D=2.7
¨
D=0.6
p-value (t test) 0.43 0.01 ,0.001
SRT 0.5660.04 0.5460.01 0.719
PRT 1.1860.09 0.6660.07 ,0.001
*Reduction of EIRT between the consecutive designated periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.t001
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To the best of our knowledge, AEIS is a unique public health
instrument encompassing all functions required for ID outbreak
response and management, which included questionnaire design,
data collection, integration, first tier data analysis, and assistance
with follow-up of cases in one package, and this is the first study to
evaluate its performance. Our evaluation indicated that the public
health personnel had mastered the new instrumentation of AEIS
within 6 months of its implementation. During 2008, the PRT
showed a pattern of diminishing drop, suggesting reaching the
trough. A preliminary analysis of the mean PRT for 2009
confirmed this notion, a mean PRT of 1.2261.18 days with
maximal of 15.76 days and minimal of 0.33 days indicated that it
was comparable to that of 2008. Analysis of EIDs demonstrated
that AEIS could indeed fulfill the purposes of providing a flexible
data collection system and rapidly tailoring it for field investigation
in diverse epidemiologic scenarios.
Elements of the public health infrastructure that could affect the
EIRT and efficient control measures include the availability of
trained professionals at all levels, proper instruments for prompt
data collection, and linkage of analysis to those making decisions in
health policy. The centralized easy-to-use databank of AEIS is an
important instrument that preserves continuity of the collective
knowledge gathered within the public health system; in essence, it
empowers and increases the proficiency of human resources.
While improved EIRT within the application of AEIS was
contingent on the ongoing vigilance of public health personnel in
following-up and evaluating the asymptomatic cases for disease
prevention and control, it should be acknowledged that AEIS
probably produces an information flow system that is conducive
for public health officers to remain vigilant. Another alternative
explanation was that the shortened PRT was only a surrogate of
an overall improvement among the elements of public health
infrastructure.
Public health RT
The bank questions and algorithms of AEIS were intended to
replace the previously repetitive personnel tasks and to make it a
part of the centralized easy-to-use personnel-system interface; the
retrievable databank helped public health system in preserving the
collective institutional knowledge. Our evaluation indicated that
the shortened EIRT mainly incurred as shortened QRT,
suggesting AEIS was well integrated into the existing public health
systems. Our experience indicated that the mean PSI for the two
EIDs were 360.57 person-hours each of which is much less than
designing a questionnaire from scratch by person. Moreover, for
H5N1, the generation of an H5N1 template questionnaire took
place when H5N1 cases were happening abroad and was before
the first reported suspected case occurred in Taiwan. Thus, for
practical purposes, the AEIS provided a mechanism to an
enhanced preparedness so that QRT for H5N1 was even shorter
than other notifiable IDs. Our research was consistent with that of
previous studies that found electronic device-based data collection
systems saved labor and time incurred in data handling [21,22].
Public health impact
Our query of whether the asymptomatic and mild cases
identified by epidemiologic investigation, as opposed to the passive
reporting of symptomatic cases might change over time. For the
case study of shigellosis and rubella demonstrated different
patterns. Rubella, with vaccine available and its communicability
prior to the onset of rash, finding more cases actively, especially
asymptomatic ones, and implementing control measures immedi-
Table 2. Proportion of shigellosis and rubella identified by epidemiologic investigation before and after the application of AEIS.
(N)
Percent of cases
(95% confidence limits)
ID type Before AEIS AEIS Application
Case characteristics 2000,03 2004,05 2006,07 2008 p-value
a
Shigellosis (818) (130) (145) (25)
Active case finding
b 34.5 39.4 37.4 28.1 0.0075
(32.9, 36.8) (34.3, 44.8) (35.7, 45.8) (28.5, 52.0)
(716) (27) (44) (15)
Asymptomatic
c 87.5 20.8 34.7 60.0 ,0.0001
(85.1, 89.6) (14.7, 28.5) (23.5, 38.3) (40.7, 76.6)
Rubella (3) (0) (49) (17)
Active case finding 5.8 0 80.3 51.5 ,0.0001
(2.0, 15.6) (68.7, 88.4) (32.5, 64.8)
(3) (2) (3)
Asymptomatic 100 - 4.1 17.6 0.1105
(43.9, 100) (1.1, 13.7) (6.2, 41.0)
aTest for trend by Cochran-Armitage: The proportion (%) that was identified by epidemiologic investigation before and after AEIS; asymptomatic cases (%) that were
identified by epidemiologic investigation before and after AEIS implementation.
bProportion of active case finding was calculated from the number of cases identified by epidemiologic investigation divided by the sum of cases identified by
epidemiologic investigation and cases reported by a physician.
cProportion of asymptomatic cases identified by epidemiologic investigation was the number of asymptomatic cases identified by epidemiologic investigation divided
by the total number of cases identified by epidemiologic investigation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.t002
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at the earlier epidemic waves. On the other hand, shigellosis, with
no specific and effective preventive measure other than rebuilding
personnel hygiene for the infected and healthy ones, the effects of
identifying higher proportion of asymptomatic cases were not
rewarded by an effective prevention intervention and transmission
blockade. In this regard, rubella would be a better choice for
public health impact of shortened PRT during epidemiologic
investigation.
Outbreak clusters of rubella began in 2007 among factories
and schools where high proportion of unimmunized foreigners
resided (Table S2). While high correlation was found between
s h o r t e n e dP R Ta n dl e s s e n e ds i z ea n dd u r a t i o no fc l u s t e r s ,w e
cannot ascertain the true causal-effects of the shortened RTs and
the outcomes with our available data. However, a positive health
impact might be especially significant in controlling diseases that
can be efficiently transmitted via asymptomatically infected
individuals [23], and also diseases with a higher basic
reproductive number (R0) [24], such as influenza, rubella and
measles. Thus, one possible explanation was the use of rubella
vaccinewhichis a specific interventionto dampen the cluster size
and duration. A shortened PRT would allow earlier intervention
of immunizing all contacts who showed no history of immuni-
zation (Table S2). These findings have prompted a policy of
requesting foreign students and workers entering Taiwan for
extended periods to receive rubella immunization prior to their
entry [25].
AEIS also provided three levels of automatic electronic
reminders for public health officers and related stakeholders,
shortened the information cycle, and assisted in the prioritization
of tasks; all can impact a shorten RT, as seen with improving the
RT of the surveillance system in a manner similar to regular
phone-call reminders [21]. Though the health impact seen with
rubella could have been assisted by the aforementioned AEIS-
related factors, however, this portion of AEIS performance was
not the focus of our evaluation in this study, but is warranted in the
future.
Therefore it is plausible, although further verification is
warranted, that the application of AEIS in integrating laboratory
information can provide a more precise estimate of R0 under
various scenarios (e.g. schools, families, hospitals, mass-population
gatherings), and possibly assess the duration and magnitude of
subsequent waves during epidemics/pandemics [26,27]. The
precision of estimating R0 will help evaluate the effectiveness of
intervention measures, such as those which occurred during the
influenza A/H1N1 pandemic [28] so as to minimize the impact on
health.
Limitations and Future Prospective
In consideration of being comprehensive, this evaluation study
did not cover the PSI on the semiautomatic data analysis and
output; and this aspect should be the focus of the next evaluation.
This study, being the first evaluation of the AEIS public health
instrument, did not cover the analysis on how the one-time cost of
Figure 4. Rubella Cases in Taiwan (A) Geographical distribution of cluster cases, (B) Weekly Cases and (C) Duration of each cluster
vs. mean PRT, 2007,2008. Duration of each cluster: the time interval between the dates of onset of the index case and the last case. For an
asymptomatic rubella case, the date of taking the specimen was taken as the date of onset. (A) Six spatial-temporal clusters of confirmed rubella
cases were identified during 2007 and 2008 (pie charts). All clusters were located in counties with incidence higher than 0.25/10
5 and foreigner
density higher than 23/10
5. Within each pie, cases identified by epidemiologic investigation are demonstrate in red, and cases reported by a
physician in light blue. (B) The 6 rubella clusters numbered according to the time of symptom onset of the respective index case of each cluster. The
weekly case numbers are presented with red bars indicating cases identified by epidemiologic investigation and light blue bars as reported by a
physician according to their onset dates in relation to the onset date of the index case. The mean PRT of each cluster with standard deviation and the
duration of the cluster occurrence are presented at the bottom. The date of onset for each confirmed case to the date of index onset are shown in
red (cases identified by epidemiologic investigation), and light blue (cases reported by a physician) bars.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.g004
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measure against the manpower saved in a long run, though it was
evident that the information technologists within Taiwan CDC did
not increase in number with the implement of AEIS. This study
did not take into account the opinion of the end users of AEIS, as
such a study had not been conducted formally. Future improve-
ments in AEIS should incorporate users’ acceptance, satisfaction
and complaints since it remains to be seen how well AEIS may be
received by public health officers. The analysis of PRT by
population density did suggest a slightly lowered PRT for the
districts with lower population density, it should be investigated in
the future whether it was due to less trained personnel or due to
the intrinsic nature of needing to travel a longer distance in serving
population scattered over a larger area. In the future, it might also
be worth evaluating the RT of data analysis. Finally, it would be
worth evaluating the possibility of extending the application of
AEIS to pharmaco-vigilance in monitoring drug and vaccine
safety or in other non-ID public health emergencies.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Supporting information for cluster definition
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.s001 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 The implementation of AEIS is to have a positive
impact on public health indicators, but it can not directly do so as
indicated with the break of the dotted arrow. Rather, AEIS can
shorten the overall EIRT by intervene a variety of RTs most
notably PRT and QRT. We further analyzed the association of
shortened RTs with improved public health outcome.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.s002 (0.07 MB
PDF)
Table S1 List of notifiable diseases requiring epidemic investi-
gation immediately upon reporting or after laboratory confirma-
tion in Taiwan.
aAFP applied only to cases younger than 15 years
of age.
bSyphilis and gonorrhea applied to cases younger than one
year old.
cDataset of HIV, AIDS and Leprosy cases have been
moved to the Chronic Diseases Management System after
November 1st, 2008.
dNDM-1-producing Enterobacteriacea have
been classified into notifiable disease since October 9
th, 2010.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.s003 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S2 Epidemiologic characteristics of rubella cluster cases in
Taiwan, 2007,2008.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.s004 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Table S3 Epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of reported
and confirmed chikungunya cases in Taiwan, from November 1
st
to December 31
st, 2008. * Chikungunya has been included in
notifiable diseases requiring epidemiologic investigation since
November 1
st 2008.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.s005 (0.05 MB
DOC)
Table S4 Epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of reported
suspect H5N1 human cases in Taiwan, 2007,2008.
aAll of
suspected H5N1 human cases were excluded by laboratory results.
On 31
st May 2007,
bH5N1 human cases were included in
notifiable disease category I, which required epidemiologic
investigation as soon as cases were reported.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014596.s006 (0.06 MB
DOC)
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